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Abstract
This paper concerns the welfare eﬀects of public abatement projects, and con-
centrates on the inﬂuence of distortionary taxes and imperfect competition in the
labor market. In addition to the direct environmental beneﬁts and costs of re-
source use, abatement policies give rise to welfare eﬀects via the tax system as
well as via changes in the employment. We also show how the cost beneﬁtr u l ei s
modiﬁed, if the other policy instrument are optimally chosen conditional on the
level of abatement.
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The welfare eﬀects of environmental policy reform are commonly analyzed
by means of cost beneﬁt analysis. In light of the Kyoto Protocol and other
agreements to reduce pollution, this literature has increased rapidly since the
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1mid 1990s. With a few exceptions1, previous studies typically concentrate
on various aspects of measuring the direct environmental beneﬁts of such
reforms and/or the direct costs. Although important for our understanding
of environmental policy, this means that previous studies commonly neglect
that the welfare eﬀects of such policy reforms depend on the functioning of
the economic system. Real world market economies are often characterized
by a number of distortions, each of which may inﬂuence the welfare eﬀects
of projects aimed at improving the environment2.
In this short paper, we consider cost beneﬁtr u l e sf o rp u b l i ca b a t e m e n t
policies under preexisting taxes on labor income, capital income and energy
input as well as imperfect competition in the labor market. As such, the
paper provides a natural complement to the literature cost beneﬁta n a l y s i so f
environmentally motivated projects, where preexisting distortions are often
being neglected, as well as to the literature on environmental taxation in the
presence of other tax distortions. The paper is, to some extent, an oﬀspring
from Aronsson et al. (2002), in which we analyze the welfare eﬀects of
increased provision of a public good, in case the other preexisting policy
instruments are not optimally chosen. We shall here extend their analysis
to an economy with environmental damage as well as by considering the
situation where the taxes and other public expenditures are optimally chosen
conditional on the public expenditures on abatement.
1The main exceptions refer to the literature on environmental taxes and/or environ-
mental tax reform in the presence of other tax distortions; see e.g. Bovenberg and de
Mooij (1994), Bovenberg and Goulder (1996), Parry et al. (1999) and Aronsson (1999).
2Methodological discussions of cost beneﬁt analysis in environmental economics are
not typically concerned with public sector aspects or labor market aspects of environ-
mental projects. The focus is, instead, concentrated on other issues such as the valuation
of nonmarket goods, equity, uncertainty and the evolution of the ecosystem. See e.g.
Pindyck (2000), Tol (2001) and the practical application by Saraﬁdes et al. (2002). See
also the introductory text by Hanley (2000) and the references therein.
22 The Model
The production side of the economy consists of many identical competitive
ﬁrms, which produce a homogenous good by using labor and energy as the
variable production factors. Since the ﬁrms are identical, we describe the
production side in terms of a single competitive ﬁrm. The objective function
can be written
Π = f (L,g) − wL − tg (1)
where Π is proﬁts, L total employment, g energy use in production, w the
wage rate and t an energy tax. Total employment, L,i sm e a s u r e da st h e
hours of work per employee, l, times the number of employed persons, N.
The production function, f(·), is increasing in each argument and strictly
concave, and we assume that the ﬁrm treats w, l and t as exogenous. The
ﬁrst order conditions implicitly deﬁne the labor demand and energy demand
functions. By using the labor demand, we can deﬁne the number of persons
to be employed conditional on the hours of work per employee,
N = N (w,l,t)( 2 )
Note also that, without loss of generality, we assume that the supply of
energy is inﬁnitely elastic. The marginal cost of producing energy is set to
zero for notational convenience.
There are M consumers in the economy, among which N are employed
and M − N unemployed. The consumers share a common utility function,
u = u(c,z,x), where c is private consumption, z leisure and x environmental
quality. The utility function is assumed to be increasing in each argument
and strictly quasiconcave. The consumers treat x as exogenous. If employed,
the budget constraint facing an individual can be written as ce = wl(1 −
τ)+π(1−s), where τ is the labor income tax rate, π proﬁt income and s the
proﬁt income tax rate. By using z = T − l,w h e r eT is a time endowment,
the ﬁrst order condition for the hours of work is given by
u
e
cw(1 − τ) − u
e
z =0 ( 3 )
3in which ue
c = ∂u(ce,z)/∂ce and ue
z = ∂u(ce,z)/∂z. In a similar way, for an
unemployed individual, the budget constraint is given by cu = q +π(1 −s),
where q is a ﬁxed unemployment beneﬁt. Proﬁt income is divided equally
among consumers3, meaning that π = Π/M.
We will make two important assumptions about wage formation; (i) the
wage formation system causes unemployment, and (ii) wage formation is
decentralized4. We interpret the latter to mean that the wage setters treat
the policy instruments facing the government and π as exogenous (recall
that π reﬂects the proﬁt level in the economy as a whole and not the par-
ticular ﬁrm where an individual happens to be employed). Examples of
such systems include wage bargaining between local unions and ﬁrms in the
context of the ’right-to-manage’ framework5 and the eﬃciency wage model.
T h ew a g er a t ew i l lb ew r i t t e na sag e n e r a lf u n c t i o no fτ, s, π, t, q and x,
i.e.6
w = ω(τ,s,π,t,q,x), (4)
The government collects tax revenues to ﬁnance the beneﬁt to the un-
employed and expenditures on abatement. The budget constraint facing the
government is written
3An alternative might be to introduce a ’ﬁrm-owner’, whose income consists of proﬁts,
while the consumption sets of the employed and unemployed only consist of labor income
and unemployment beneﬁts, respectively. Such a change of assumption will inﬂuence the
distributional aspects of environmental policy. It is not important for the qualitative
eﬀects associated with the preexisting taxes and employment, which are of main concern
below.
4Although bargaining systems diﬀer across countries, Calmfors (1993) argues that
there has been a tendency towards more decentralized wage formation.
5An overview of models used to analyze unionized labor markets is given by Oswald
(1985).
6It is straight forward to interpret equation (4) as the outcome of union wage forma-
tion. Under right-to-manage wage setting, the objectives and constraints of employed
and unemployed union members, as well as the parameters facing the ﬁrm, will aﬀect
the wage rate. In an eﬃciency wage model, on the other hand, the tax system may only
aﬀect the equilibrium wage rate if it has an inﬂuence on the eﬀort function.
4τwNl + tg + sΠ − (M − N)q − α =0 ( 5 )
where α represents the resources spent on abatement. By combining the
private budget constraints, the objective function of the ﬁrm and the gov-
ernment budget constraint, we obtain the resource constraint
f (Nl,g) − Nc
e − (M − N)c
u − α =0 ( 6 )
which will be used below.
Finally, the environmental quality, x, will be assumed to be a decreas-
ing function of energy use in production and an increasing function of the
expenditures on abatement. We have
x = p(g,α)( 7 )
where ∂p/∂g<0a n d∂p/∂α > 0.
3A G e n e r a l C o s t B e n e ﬁtR u l ef o rα
In this section, we shall only require that the private sector has chosen its
decision variables, l, w, N and g, in an optimal way conditional on the policy
instruments. By using the necessary conditions for these decision variables
together with equation (7), which enables us to write x in terms of g and α,
we can deﬁne l, w, N and g as functions of τ, s, t, q and α. Suppose also
that the energy tax is used to raise the additional revenues needed to ﬁnance
increases in the level of abatement. This means that the behavioral equations
can be written as l0 = l(τ,s,q,α), w0 = w(τ,s,q,α), N0 = N (τ,s,q,α)a n d
g0 = g(τ,s,q,α), in which we recognize that the energy tax will be a function
of the other policy instruments, t = t(τ,s,q,α). The superindex ”0” is used
to denote that the private sector has made an optimal choice conditional on
the policy instruments.














5To shorten the notations below, let us deﬁne ue = u(ce,z,x), uu = u(cu,T,x),
 u = ue −uu, B =[ Nue
x +(M −N)uu
x][∂x/∂α]a n d∂x/∂α =[ ∂p(g,α)/∂g]
[∂g/∂α]+∂p(g,α)/∂α.D i ﬀerentiating equations (6) and (8) with respect to
α, and using the private budget constraints in combination with the neces-
sary condition for the hours of work, we obtain;































































In addition to the diﬀerence between the direct marginal beneﬁts and
costs, B0 − ue,0
c , there are three remaining eﬀects which have to do with
the functioning of the economic system. The third term in the ﬁrst row
(containing the bracket) represents the welfare eﬀects via the preexisting
tax system, which are measured conditional on the number of employed
persons, and the tax revenue eﬀect associated with the change in the energy
tax rate. Each preexisting tax inﬂuences the cost beneﬁt rule for abatement
via a tax base eﬀect, and an increase in the abatement may either increase
or decrease the preexisting tax distortions. The ﬁr s tp a r to ft h es e c o n d
row measures the welfare eﬀects associated with changes in the number of
employed persons. Additional employment implies a utility gain for those
who become employed (the ﬁrst term within the bracket) and an increase
in the tax revenues net of transfer payment (the second term within the
bracket). Finally, the last two terms in the second row, together, measure
6a distributional eﬀect associated with the changes in w and t: changes in w
aﬀect both the labor income and the proﬁt income, and changes in t aﬀect
the proﬁt income. This distributional eﬀect arises because unemployment
gives rise to heterogeneity among consumers.
4C o s t B e n e ﬁt Analysis in the Conditional Second Best
So far, we have made no assumptions about how the government has chosen
the other policy instruments (other than the expenditures on abatement).
This means that the cost beneﬁt analysis carried out in the previous section
applies to any initial level of the policy variables. Suppose, instead, that the
government has chosen τ, s, t and q conditional on α by maximizing the so-
cial welfare function subject to the necessary conditions of the private sector
and the resource constraint. Since α inﬂuences the necessary conditions of
the private sector via (i) the other policy instruments and (ii) x,a n ds i n c e
x = p(g,α), we can deﬁne l∗ = ¯ l(τ∗,s ∗,t ∗,q∗,α), w∗ =¯ w(τ∗,s ∗,t ∗,q∗,α),
N∗ = ¯ N(τ∗,s ∗,t ∗,q ∗,α)a n dg∗ =¯ g(τ∗,s ∗,t ∗,q∗,α), while τ∗, s∗, t∗ and
q∗ are, in turn, functions of α. The superindex ”∗”i su s e dt od e n o t et h e
socially optimal resource allocation, which is deﬁned conditional on α.B y
substituting the conditionally optimal solution back into the Lagrangean
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∗)c
u,∗ − α]
where ce,∗ = w∗l∗(1 − τ∗)+π∗(1 − s∗)a n dcu,∗ = q∗ + π∗(1 − s∗), and µ∗ is
the Lagrange multiplier evaluated at the social optimum and measures the
social value of one additional unit of output. By using that the Lagrangean
is equal to the social welfare function at the optimum, we can derive;
Proposition 2 If the taxes and other public expenditures are chosen to sup-
port the second best resource allocation, which is deﬁned conditional on α,

































The essence behind Proposition 2 is that, if the taxes and other public
expenditures are optimally chosen conditional on α, all indirect eﬀects of α
via the policy variables vanish as a consequence of optimization. This means
that Ω∗ reﬂects the directs eﬀects of α on the private decision variables and
the eﬀect on x∗. If environmental quality is additively separable in terms of












In this case, therefore, the cost beneﬁt rule for abatement resembles the
simple policy of comparing direct marginal beneﬁts and costs.
5 Summary and Discussion
The basic message of this paper is that the functioning of the economic sys-
tem matters for the welfare eﬀects of public abatement projects. This is here
exempliﬁed by the inﬂuences of preexisting taxes and imperfect competition
in the labor market. If the other policies are not optimal conditional on the
initial level of abatement, we show that abatement policy gives rise to wel-
fare eﬀects via the preexisting tax system and via changes in employment.
Although expected, at least in part, from the literature on environmental
taxation, this means that important aspects of environmental projects may
have been overlooked in previous studies. We also analyze the welfare ef-
fects of an increase in abatement in the special case, where the preexisting
taxes and other public expenditures are optimally chosen conditional on the
level of abatement. In this case, the cost beneﬁt rule comes closer to the
comparison between direct marginal beneﬁts and costs.
8References
[1]Aronsson, T. (1999) On Cost Beneﬁt Rules for Green Taxes. Environ-
mental and Resource Economics 13,3 1 - 4 3 .
[2]Aronsson, T., L¨ ofgren, K-G. and Sj¨ ogren, T. (2002) On the Provision of
Public Goods in an Economy with Union Wage Setting and Distortionary
Taxation. Umea Economic Studies no 581.
[3]Bovenberg, L. and Goulder, L. (1996) Optimal Environmental Taxation
in the Presence of Other Taxes: General Equilibrium Analyses. American
Economic Review 86, 985-1000.
[4]Bovenberg, L. and de Mooij, R. (1994) Environmental Levies and Dis-
tortionary Taxation. American Economic Review 84, 1085-1089.
[5]Hanley, N. (2000) Cost-Beneﬁt Analysis. In Folmer, H. and Gabel,
L. (eds) Principles of Environmental and Resource Economics.C h e l -
tenham: Edward Elgar.
[6]Oswald, A.J. (1985) The Economic Theory of Trade Unions: An Intro-
ductory Survey. The Scandinavian Journal of Economics 87, 160-193.
[7]Parry, I., Williams, R. and Goulder, L. (1999) When Can Carbon Abate-
ment Policies Increase Welfare? The Fundamental Role of Distorted Fac-
tor Markets. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 37,
52-84.
[8]Pindyck, R. (2000) Irreversibilities and the Timing of Environmental
Policy. Resource and Energy Economics 22, 233-259.
[9]Saraﬁdis, Y., Mirasgedis, S., Georgopoulou, E. and Lalas, D.P. (2002)
Economic Evaluation of Carbon Dioxide Emission Abatement Measures
in the Greek Energy Sector. Journal of Environmental Planning and
Management 45, 181-198.
[10]Tol, R. (2001) Equitable Cost-Beneﬁt Analysis of Climate Change Poli-
cies. Ecological Economics 36, 71-85.
9